The US-Israel and Iran conflict has expanded regionally, with Iran targeting Gulf neighbors. Tehran has significantly reduced missile and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia, placing the Kingdom in a “third tier” behind other Gulf states in terms of the amount of fire received. The United Arab Emirates has been the most attacked.
Iran’s retaliation following late-February US-Israeli strikes has focused on several Gulf states hosting or supporting US assets: primarily the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and to a lesser extent Oman. Open sources note that Iran continues to launch the most attacks against the UAE, with Saudi Arabia receiving a smaller share of the salvoes.
A comprehensive tally for the UAE shows that by March 3–4, the UAE Ministry of Defence reported approximately 189 ballistic missiles, 941 drone attacks, and several cruise missiles launched since the conflict began; most were intercepted, but some caused damage through debris and a few direct hits.
The precise count for the UAE is in the high hundreds to low thousands of projectiles, whereas Saudi-specific counts appear only in incident-based reports (waves of “several” or “dozens” at a time), which confirms that Saudi Arabia has been attacked less intensely than the UAE in terms of sheer projectile volume.
As the US-Israel and Iran conflict has become region-wide, it is evident that Saudi Arabia has faced far less retaliation than its Gulf neighbors. Why has Iran spared Saudi Arabia, traditionally its biggest rival? Given Iran’s aggressive actions across the Gulf, there must have been a reason for Tehran’s restraint toward Saudi Arabia. The Iranian regime likely assessed that restraint was more beneficial.
Could this selective restraint be linked to détente fostered by China between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023? That rapprochement offered mutual benefits, including a deal concerning the Houthis and, apparently, assurances that Iran would not involve Saudi Arabia in retaliations against Israel. If Iran had attacked Saudi Arabia as aggressively as other Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Tehran would likely have jeopardized many agreements made with Riyadh through back channels and secret deals.
The Saudi-Iran deal was mutually advantageous by deescalating their proxy confrontation, especially via the Houthis, in exchange for domestic and regional security and political gains each regime sought. Saudi Arabia needed this to divert some spending from security to Vision 2030, which has increased the country’s financial burden. Riyadh is working hard to address deficits, debt, and obligations of its sovereign wealth fund to keep the project progressing.
While increased aggression between Iran and Saudi Arabia is undesirable, commentators question the extent of secret talks and back-channel deals, as Saudi Arabia remains relatively unscathed amid Iranian violence towards Gulf states, none of which facilitated US-Israeli attacks from their territory.
One way or another, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman might be relieved that Iran’s anger was redirected elsewhere in the region. However, he should anticipate questions from fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members about why they bore the brunt while he largely escaped unscathed.
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