Behind the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces lies a regional conflict involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and several transnational armed networks. Yet, the international debate mainly focuses on accusations against the United Arab Emirates. A more comprehensive view requires examining the chemical weapons attributed to the army, the foreign support for General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, and the military resurgence of Islamists from Omar al-Bashir’s former regime.
Sudan, a country sacrificed in an internationalized war
The situation in Sudan is no longer a mere conflict between two generals. It represents a national collapse, a proxy war between foreign powers, and a global communication battle where some interventions are constantly highlighted while others are curiously sidelined. Since April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, have been fighting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemetti. This war has displaced approximately 13 to 14 million people. By 2026, around 33.7 million Sudanese require humanitarian assistance, with some regions in Darfur and Kordofan experiencing famine conditions. Documented statistics record tens of thousands of deaths, but estimates reported by the Washington Post suggest up to 150,000 victims. The actual toll could be even higher, as precise counts of those dying from hunger, disease, hospital collapses, or lack of medicine are lacking.
Amidst this catastrophe, a crucial question remains inadequately addressed: why does the international debate focus almost exclusively on accusations against the United Arab Emirates when the al-Burhane camp also has extensive foreign support systems? Why does the supposed origin of a weapon used by the RSF immediately mobilize action against Abu Dhabi, while Iranian drones, Turkish military contracts, Egyptian backing, Saudi alignment, and the reemergence of Islamist networks are seldom analyzed together?
While not denying the atrocities attributed to the RSF, ethnic massacres, sexual violence, looting, forced displacements, and attacks against civilians, particularly in Darfur, are documented and must be prosecuted. Yet, condemning the crimes of one side does not justify overlooking those of the other, nor does it warrant portraying the Sudanese army as a neutral and inherently legitimate institution.
Al-Burhane does not lead a politically neutral army
Depicting the SAF as a regular republican army merely defending the state overlooks much of Sudan’s recent history. For thirty years, Omar al-Bashir’s regime transformed the army, intelligence services, administration, banks, and part of the economy into the pillars of an authoritarian system steeped in political Islam. Under this regime, wars against peripheral populations, internal repression, and campaigns in Darfur caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and displaced millions. Al-Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. His regime hosted Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and made Sudan a hub for various transnational Islamist networks.
Al-Burhane is not an exact replica of al-Bashir and presents himself as a military figure without ideological ties. However, the institution he leads has never been fully purged of the former regime’s structures. The war has provided them with an opportunity to reorganize. A Reuters investigation documented the organized return of cadres from al-Bashir’s National Congress Party and the Sudanese Islamist movement alongside the army. Islamist leaders claim credit for SAF victories, while their networks contributed to recruiting thousands of fighters and training many volunteers. Several individuals linked to the former system have also regained influence in regions administered by Port Sudan authorities.
The key question isn’t whether al-Burhane personally belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s about identifying the forces his military apparatus depends on and those that could demand their share of power if victorious. An army relying on ideological brigades and networks of a former Islamist regime doesn’t become politically neutral just because its commander wears the state’s official uniform.
The coup that destroyed the democratic transition
Al-Burhane didn’t seize power to save a civilian transition threatened by the RSF. In October 2021, he led, alongside Hemetti, the coup that halted the transition initiated after al-Bashir’s fall. The two were partners then, jointly neutralizing civilians, arresting political leaders, and restoring military dominance over the state.
Their alliance shattered over who would hold command, how quickly the RSF would be integrated into the army, and which general would ultimately control the country, its institutions,
Leave a Reply