The EU’s Defense Initiative Lacks Strategy and Political Mandate

It is almost 30 years since the last collaborative defence initiative collapsed, leaving Europe’s military clout weaker than ever. The Saint-Malo agreement’s promises of ‘hard power’ proved a mirage, the European Defence Agency largely toothless, and the EU’s battlegroups more a paper army than a deployable force.

Today, Europe’s governments are committing hundreds of billions yearly to defence, but still without a credible blueprint. Disputes continue over Ukraine, over the balance between drones, AI and conventional weapons, and over how to share joint projects fairly.

Research shows that European commitments are not as weak or underfunded as critics suggest, but fragmentation and national protection of defence industries remain Europe’s central weakness. Unless rearmament is centralised and roles clearly defined, money will be wasted.

More worrying still is the lack of political debate. Leaders take for granted that solidarity with Ukraine equals public backing for higher defence budgets, but populist parties could yet derail the effort. Without a clear doctrine and broad mandate, Europe’s rearmament risks repeating the failures of the past.

Has there been sufficient change of late to inspire confidence that Europe’s divisions and rivalries will be overcome? Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have between them driven home to Europe that its security can only be collective, but there’s still no credible defence blueprint.

Europe’s governments are budgeting to spend hundreds of billions yearly on defence, yet haven’t spelled out what is being defended, against whom, how and with what weapons and resources. At a strategic level, there’s an urgent need for a European security doctrine setting out goals and red lines matched by a defence capabilities plan.

Europe’s ‘coalition of the willing’ may at some point have to put peacekeeping ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, but its weaknesses are daunting. The UK and France wrangle over their soldiers’ rules of engagement – should these deter Russian assaults or respond to them? As to capability shortcomings, the Europeans would have to rely on the US for intelligence, for many weapons systems and logistical support.

The question marks over a ‘trip wire’ force in Ukraine point to the key elements of a defence and rearmament plan that Europeans have yet to agree upon. The extent to which drones and AI must displace conventional weapons, the complex process of disengaging from US controls and equitable sharing of joint weapons projects are areas where many European governments are still at odds.

More positively, it should be said that Europe’s defence commitments are not as weak and underfunded as critics maintain. NATO’s European members spend proportionately as much on security as the United States and have compensated for their reliance on US force projection through massive purchases of American weaponry.

In a recent report to the Pentagon, the leading US security think tank RAND added up all the costs within NATO and found the Europeans bearing a comparable burden to the US. It said the proportion of GDP spent on defence that’s so widely cited distorts the picture because it doesn’t take big indirect expenses into account.

When peacekeeping missions and costly economic sanctions are added to direct defence spending, the balance sheet for collective worldwide security in partnership with the US looks very different. The Europeans account for 38% of it; Asian, Arab and Latin American allies for 23% , and America’s share at 39%. “Not a flashing red sign that we’re being taken to the cleaners”, commented the RAND researchers.

Europe’s weakness is the fragmentation of its armed forces and the protection national governments give to their own defence industries. EU governments, along with the UK, need to commit to far closer collaboration. Their defence spending pledges risk being meaningless if they persist with national procurements that duplicate weapons systems.

The European Commission has suggested that the EU’s plan for joint defence funding should be flanked by a new Brussels-based procurement supremo. This brought howls of protest from national capitals and the national champions in their defence industries. Europe’s weapons exporters enjoy a major share of the global armaments market and resist any measures to dilute these.

It is nevertheless plain that Europe cannot bumble along by trying to fit together different national arrangements into a coherent whole. It needs to centralise its re